The fire caught my attention - my son had served on the ship, in the late 90s and early 2000s. He was in the part of the ship that was air-conditioned and comfortable - his crew handled the wiring/hardware for the fire control mechanisms that made the big guns go "boom". They worked in conjunction with the software/networking guys to keep them working.
He enjoyed his time in the service (not enough, however, to commit to another long hitch - he's basically a homebody, and was anxious to get home to Cleveland). He told us that either he was working around the clock, or his job was light duty, and he had time to perfect his video gaming.
That fits his style of functioning. He likes to kick back and take his time on the job. But, he also has a turbo mode, when he becomes hyper-focused and able to handle a rapidly changing environment with murky information. The kind of guy who thrives in combat.
But, that wasn't the path he took. When he left the service, he puttered around for a while, and ended up in a job utilizing his electronic skills. He is now the main guy at his company (don't know if he has a title, but he handles it all - production, inventory, shipping - with the aid of a small staff).
But, the BHR - I asked him about the fire when it first happened, and questioned whether it was a deliberate act of sabotage. He doubted it, and thought it likelier to be a case of accident, coupled with some errors in handling the weaponry/ammo. He explained that accidents were not unusual (although the consequences were seldom this bad). It's a big ship, and moves a lot of men and equipment throughout the world. In an environment where people cut corners, things will happen.
All of which argues for the old time culture of running a tight ship. Both the officers and the crew need to seriously fear the consequences of falling down on the job. In a complex system, the outcome of not following procedures to the letter could be deadly.
So. More than likely, not an intentional act. A small incident, followed by lax oversight or insufficiently trained crew (or, as it was being repaired, outside contractors not knowing proper procedure). And, the result was massively expensive damage, injuries, and lost lives.
It should be taken for what it is - a powerful argument for a massive overhaul of Navy personnel, training, and a weeding out of the officers that can't cut it. Not focus on 'DIE' - diversity, inclusion, and equity.
Competence. And the courage to put the finger on those not performing, even if they are one or more of the protected classes.
Start with the flag officers - move out those who are more given to bitchin' and moanin', and less concerned about instilling a battle-ready culture. Those who don't/won't measure up, DE-mote them, and put their careers in stall mode.
Next level down - with the deadweight gone, have their section supervisors meet with the junior officers, and put the fear of God in them, should they fail to measure up.
Every working section - fire control, mess, inventory, ordnance, etc. (don't know if I'd got the lingo right, but you know what I mean) - ALL need to focus on training, practice, and performance. Those that form the "complaint crew" and will not get on board with the new culture, will be written up, warned, and - should they not change - discharged with a General classification. Nothing Honorable about not trying.
Those that were just put in positions they were not competent to fill will be given the option of a transfer to a more appropriate job (with reduction in grade if necessary), or an Honorable Discharge. Either way, get them out of a job they are not competent to fill.
And, flat-out eliminate those make-work touchy-feely jobs - DIE type. Reward/promote those who have been carrying the load.
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